# Skeen Reference Agent Blueprint # Specification: Vendor-Neutral Multi-Agent Governance Manifest # License: MIT (Reference Architecture Specification) apiVersion: architecture.skeen.biz/v1alpha1 kind: AgentBlueprint metadata: id: zero-trust-edge-watch name: Read-Only Edge, DNS & Certificate Watch version: "1.2.0" lane: edge-and-systems-watch classification: strictly-read-only-monitor summary: >- Enforces GET-only monitoring across edge zones, Zero Trust tunnels, TLS certificates, and service-token expiry windows; compares live telemetry against a canonical baseline snapshot and alerts only on verified state transitions. governance: lethal_trifecta_controls: reads_raw_untrusted_payloads: false holds_system_of_record_write_credentials: false autonomous_external_egress: false rationale: >- Authenticates through a dedicated read-only service token scoped exclusively to HTTP GET control-plane endpoints. Write, PATCH, POST, PUT, and DELETE verbs are denied at both the token scope level and the local loopback proxy. scope: permitted_read_scope: - source: edge-control-plane-api methods_allowed: ["GET", "HEAD"] resources: - zone-settings-and-dnssec-status - zero-trust-tunnel-connector-health - access-application-policy-posture - service-token-expiration-metadata - edge-tls-certificate-validity-windows - source: public-origin-probes methods_allowed: ["GET", "HEAD"] resources: - tls-handshake-and-expiry-days - http-status-and-redirect-chain - security-response-headers-csp-hsts hard_write_boundary: never_autonomous: - Mutating DNS records, WAF rules, TLS settings, or Access policies (no POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) - Creating, rotating, or revoking service tokens or API credentials - Restarting origin daemons or tunnel connectors without an approved before/after change card - Messaging stakeholders directly when all monitored dimensions match the baseline snapshot enforcement_mechanism: >- Scoped read-only credential at the edge plus local proxy method allowlist (GET/HEAD only); any configuration remediation must be emitted as a before/after proposal pack for human OK. monitoring_and_diff_policy: baseline_comparison: canonical_snapshot_file: "state/edge-baseline-snapshot.json" deduplication_ledger: "state/edge-seen-transitions.json" alert_on: - tunnel_status != "healthy" - tls_days_remaining < 30 - service_token_days_remaining < 90 - unexpected_access_policy_drift == true - origin_http_status >= 500 suppress_when: - condition_hash_already_acknowledged == true - state == "green-no-drift" verification_and_audit: artifact_name: Signed Edge State Snapshot & Drift Report artifact_format: Canonical JSON Snapshot + Diff Markdown required_fields: - probe_timestamp_utc - baseline_snapshot_sha256 - live_snapshot_sha256 - drift_detected_boolean - tunnel_connector_count_and_status - min_tls_expiry_days - min_service_token_expiry_days - proposed_remediation_before_after